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Skeins: Title to Substances Determined to Be Minerals as a Matter of Law

MINES AND MINERALS-Title to Minerals-Title to
Substances Determined To Be Minerals as a Matter of
Law Is Held by Owner of the Mineral Estate.
Moser v. United States Steel Corp.
26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8, 1983).
In 1949, the Mosers' predecessors in title acquired a 6.77-acre tract in
Live Oak County from Gefferts' predecessors.1 The conveying deed expressly reserved all of the "oil, gas, and other minerals" in favor of the
grantors.2 When uranium was later discovered beneath the surface, the
Mosers sued to establish title to the substance, contending that it was not
one of the "other minerals" reserved for the mineral estate.' The trial
court held that the uranium belonged to the mineral estate, and the court
of civil appeals affirmed.4 The Mosers perfected an appeal to the Texas
1. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980), af'd, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8, 1983). Margaret and William Moser are
the executors and trustees of the Catherine Lyne estate. See id. at 732. Defendants include
twelve members of the Geffert family, the U.S. Steel Corporation (lessee), the N.M. Uranium Corporation (lessee), and the Atlantic Richfield Company (overriding royalty). See id.
at 732.
2. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 427 (June 8, 1983).
The 1949 deed conveying the land in question contained language reserving "[A]Il of the oil,
gas, and other minerals of every kind and character, in, on, and under that may be produced
from said tract of land." Id. at 427.
3. See id. at 427. The Mosers, however, leased a mineral interest that they had reserved
in a 6.42-acre tract conveyed to the Gefferts' predecessors in exchange for the 6.77-acre tract
at issue. See id at 427. The deed conveying the 6.42-acre tract contained the identical
language used in the deed reserving the minerals of the 6.77-acre tract. See id at 427.
4. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980), af'd, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 430 (June 8, 1983). At trial the issues were decided
upon the surface destruction test enunciated in Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex.
1971) and modified in Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (Reed I). See Moser
v. United States Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980), af#'d, 26
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8, 1983). The surface destruction test, announced by the Acker
court, is that if the minerals lying near the surface could be mined only with destruction to
the surface, then the mineral belonged to the surface estate. See Acker v. Guinn, 464
S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). The court, however, in Reed I modified the Acker test by
placing the burden upon the surface owner to show that "as of the date of the instrument
being construed, if the substance near the surface had been extracted, that extraction would
necessarily have consumed or depleted the land surface." See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d
169, 172 (Tex. 1977). Although the Eastland Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision in Moser, it applied a modified version of the surface destruction test. This modification was announced in Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (Reed II), while

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2022], No. 2, Art. 10

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:477

Supreme Court.5 Held-Affirmed 6 Title to substances determined to be
minerals as a matter of law is held by the owner of the mineral estate.7
By 1900 severing mineral interests from a fee estate had become widely
accepted.' This division, accomplished by grant or reservation, results in
two distinct estates, each with "separate corporeal hereditaments

. . .

and

all the rights incident to separate ownership." 9 Early in the development
of this practice the mineral owner asserted his position of dominance by
exercising his right to ingress and egress, to production of the minerals,
and to reasonable use of the surface' ° to extract the minerals."

the Eastland court was in session hearing the Moser appeal. See Moser v. United States
Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 427 (June 8, 1983). The modified version of the test
altered the measurement date "as of the date of the instrument" to a measurement at the
time of the conveyance or thereafter. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980)
(ReedII). Even though the Eastland court applied the modified version of theAcker test, it
arrived at the same conclusion as the trial court; the uranium located near the surface could
be extracted without causing substantial harm to the surface. See Moser v. United States
Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980), aff'd, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.
427 (June 8, 1983).
5. Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 427 (June 8, 1983).
6. See id at 430. The court held that the Gefferts (appellees) were the owners of the
uranium "as a matter of law." Id at 430.
7. See id at 428.
8. See, e.g., Del Monte Mining Co. v. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U.S. 55, 60 (1898)
(at common law fee owner allowed to convey his interest in minerals); Delaware, L. & W.R.
Co. v. Sanderson, I A. 394, 397 (Del. 1885) (severance of minerals from underlying strata
created separate ownership from surface); Sanderson v. City of Scranton, 105 Pa. 469, 474
(1884) (divided ownership occurred from severance of minerals). See generaly Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs: Conflicts Between Surface and Mineral Owners, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST.

995, 997 (1980).

9. See Smith v. Jones, 60 P. 1104, 1106 (Utah 1900); 1 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF OIL & GAS 77 (1962). The court in Smith v. Jones held that there may be double
ownership, by separate titles, "each having a fee or lesser estate in his respective part." See
Smith v. Jones, 60 P. 1104, 1106 (Utah 1900). Since there were rights incident to separate
ownership, this meant that "the surface land... may be partitioned the same as when there
is no mineral underlying it." Id at 1106.
10. See Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 481, 304 S.W.2d 362, 363
(1957) (reasonable use interpreted not to mean surface restoration); Harrie v. Currie, 142
Tex. 93, 99, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (1943) (delay rentals belong to mineral estate based on
right to use surface to extract minerals); Broyles, The Right to Mine Texas Uraniumand Coal
By Surface Methods." Acker v. Guinn Revisited, 13 Hous. L. REV. 451, 453 (1976) (mineral
owner's implied right to use surface as reasonably necessary).
11. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972) (lessee has implied
grant of free use of part of land necessary to extract minerals); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470
S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971) (lessee has right to use surface regardless of damage, where only
one method is available to extract minerals); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420
S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967) (lessee's right to use surface dictated by terms of lease); Warren
Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 157 Tex. 479, 482, 304 S.W.2d 362, 363 (1957) (absent negligence, lessee has no implied duty to pay for damages to surface); Warren Petroleum Corp. v.
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Nonetheless, the interest of the surface owner in protecting his property
from destruction continuously competed with the rights of the mineral
owner.' 2 Whenever the courts dealt with this conffict, mineral owners
were usually held liable for their negligence in causing injury to the surface.' 3 Initially negligence was found whenever mineral owners had exceeded their rights to use the surface reasonably in extracting the
minerals.1 4 Later in Getty Oil v. Jones, '" however, negligence was measured in terms of how much the mineral owner had interfered with the
surface owner's rights to use the surface.' 6 Moreover, the courts closely
monitored the stress placed upon surface estates by strip mining; in trying
to balance the competing interest, they closely scrutinized instruments that
did not grant or reserve minerals specifically by name." Those situations
where mineral rights were granted or reserved by the term "other minerals" were among the ones often litigated as to title and damages. 8

Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 469, 271 S.W.2d 410, 413 (1954) (oil lessee under no duty to protect
property of subsequent surface lessee); Lomax v. Henderson, 559 S.W.2d 466, 467 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (right of mineral owner to use surface estate based upon
right to enforce and enjoy mineral estate).
12. See, e.g., Smith v. Moore, 474 P.2d 794, 795 (Colo. 1970) (mineral owner defending
rights in deed and surface owner defending against destruction of estate); Martin v. Kentucky Oak Mining Co., 429 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ky. 1968) (surface owner seeking to deny
lessee-operator right to strip or auger mine); Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 313 N.E.2d
374, 376 (Ohio 1974) (mineral owner asserting right to strip mine coal and surface owner
defending right to subjacent support).
13. See Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs Conflicts Between Surface and MineralOwners, 26
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 995, 1007 (1980). The author indicates that surface owners'
suits based upon nuisances, breaches of duty imposed by regulations and statutes, and strict
liability have been less successful than suits brought on grounds of negligence. See id at
1007 n.44.
14. See Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134-35 (Tex. 1967) (mineral lessee's construction and use of road held not to exceed reasonable use); General Crude
Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 109, 344 S.W.2d 668, 673 (1961) (mineral owner held negligent for method of salt water disposal that led to pollution of surface owner's fresh water
supply); Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 95, 344 S.W.2d 863, 866 (1961) (lessee found negligent in disposal of salt water pollutants).
15. 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
16. See id.at 623.
17. See Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs: Conflicts Between Surface and MineralOwners, 26
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 995, 1002 (1980); see also Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 350
(Tex. 1971) (court gave close scrutiny to term "other minerals"); Zeppa v. Houston Oil Co.,
113 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1938, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court considered
entire instrument to ascertain intent of parties). See generally Ferguson, Severed Surface and
Mineral Estates-Right to Use, Damage or Destroy the Surface to Recover Minerals, 19
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 411, 418-19 (1974).
18. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (modification of.4cker surface
destruction test); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (lex. 1977) (extraction standard based
on date instrument executed severing estates); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex.
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Over the past fifty years, Texas courts have employed several approaches in construing the term "other minerals" in order to establish title
to unnamed substances.' 9 The earlier cases reflect the courts' attempts to
define the term either by considering the scientific and technical definition
of the substance
itself or by considering the ordinary meaning of the term
"mineral." 2 ° In another line of cases, 2 ' the courts applied or rejected the
doctrine of eusdem generis, wherein "an enumeration of specific things
followed by some more general word or phrase. . such general word or
phrase is to be held to refer to things of the same kind." 22 In some cases
before 1971, however, and in all cases thereafter, substances that would
cause damage to the surface when extracted were held to belong to the
surface estate. 23 To some extent, the courts also relied upon the general
1971) (title determined by effects of extraction upon surface estate); Southland Royalty Co.
v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. 1964) ("other minerals" determined by examining minerals named specifically in instrument).
19. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (court uses surface destruction test to determine title to minerals); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994,
997 (1949) (scientific definition rejected as test to determine whether substance a mineral);
Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206, 216 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ refd n.r.e.)
(limestone, caliche, and surface shale construed according to environment at time of execution); Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915, 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no writ)
(rejection of ejusdem generis as method to determine whether substance is mineral). The
Acker court also focused upon application of Professor Eugene Kuntz's theory that general
intent should govern the construction of the term "other minerals." See Acker v. Guinn, 464
S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (general intent of parties to sever mineral and surface estates);
Comment, Lignite.- Surface or Mineral-The Surface DestructionTest and More, 29 BAYLOR
L REV. 879, 882 (1977) (acknowledging need for uniform approach to determine title to
substances). So varied were the approaches to determining title that Professors Williams
and Meyers saw the need for a legal description of the term "mineral" which could be generally applied in any instrument. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 219
(1975).
20. See, e.g., Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) (rare and
exceptional substances at issue held to be minerals); Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 659
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd n.r.e) (term "minerals" too broad to be used in a
technical sense); Union Sulphur Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 42 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1931, writ refd) (solid sulphur deposits not included in reservation).
21. Compare Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50,
54 (Tex. 1964) (rejection of eyusdem generis in construing title to minerals) and Rio Bravo
Oil Co. v. McEntire, 128 Tex. 124, 138, 95 S.W.2d 381, 388 (1936) (eusdem generis not
considered as method to determine title) with Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhhmeyer,
134 Tex. 574, 582, 136 S.W.2d 800, 805 (1940) (ejusdem generis only an aid in interpreting
deed) and Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co., 106 Tex. 94, 103, 157
S.W. 737, 739-40 (1913) (court upheld eyusdem generis in construing title to minerals).
22. Stevenson v. Record Pub. Co. 107 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1937,
writ ref'd).
23. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 750-51 (Tex. 1980) (lignite, coal, or iron near
surface retained by surface estate if extraction would damage surface); Reed v. Wylie, 554
S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (coal and lignite not conveyed by oil, gas, and "other mineral"
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intentions of the parties at the time of the making of the instrument in
deciding the issue of title.2 4 This lack of judicial uniformity resulted in
uncertainty of title to minerals and impeded both conservation and development of the natural resources of this state.25
The Texas Supreme Court's first major departure from its traditional
method of determining title by looking to the character of the substance
itself came in 1971 in Acker v. Guinn. 26 This case presented the question
provision); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 353 (Tex. 1971) (iron ore held by surface estate
if extraction would damage surface); Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1975, no writ) (coal and lignite excluded from mineral reservation when either
could be removed only by open pit or strip mining methods); see also Atwood v. Rodman,
355 S.W.2d 206, 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ refd n.r.e.) (sand, clay, limestone,
and caliche recovered by surface owner because removal possible only with surface damage); Elridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605, 607-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952, writ
ret'd n.r.e.) (destruction of surface a factor in determining whether limestone was reserved in
conveyance of surface). The two Reed cases, noted above, were heard by the same court,
initially in 1977 and again in 1980, after the substance at issue was accurately located. See
Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980).
24. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (adopted Professor Kuntz's
theory of general intent in construing implied grant). Professor Kuntz realized the nonexistence of a specific intent within the instrument and suggested that the courts should
examine the instrument closely to determine the general intent of the parties. See Kuntz,
The Law Relating to Oiland Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wvo. L.J. 107, 112 (1949). He stated that
this general intent was dependent upon the intended manner of enjoyment anticipated by
the parties and further reasoned that, in the absence of specific intent, the parties' general
intention to sever all substances of value should be the basis upon which all minerals of
value could be included as having been granted or reserved when using the term "other
minerals." See id. at 112-13; see also Comment, Lignite-Surface or Mineral? The Single
Test Causes Double Trouble, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 287, 293 (1976) (suggesting courts should
initially identify all "legally cognizable" minerals which would pass to mineral estate, subject to mineral owners' liability for damages caused by extraction).
25. See Comment, Lignite.- Surface or Mineral-The Surface Destruction Test and
More, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 879, 884-85 (1977). The Texas Constitution mandates that "[T]he
conservation and development of all the natural resources of this state. . . are each and all
hereby declared public rights and duties ..
" TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59.
26. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971); see Broyles, The Right to Mine Texas Uranium and
Coal By Surface Methods: Acker v. Guinn Revisited, 13 Hous. L. REv. 451, 459-62 (1976).
Caselaw prior to Acker approached the matter of title to minerals by looking to the substances and minerals themselves. See, e.g., Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d
994, 997 (1949) (minerals viewed in accordance with their potential value as rare and exceptional); Fleming Found. v. Texaco, 337 SW.2d 846, 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960,
writ refd n.r.e.) (substance not mineral based on ordinary and natural meaning of term
"mineral"); Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (sand and gravel not mineral in ordinary sense of term "mineral"). In Acker,
however, the effects of extraction upon the surface became the test of title; henceforth, the
issues of ownership of the substance and the issue of surface use became intertwined, leading
to complexity and confusion. See Lopez, Upstairs/Downstairs."Conflicts Between Surface
and Mineral Owners, 26 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 995, 1015 (1980); Comment, The Need
for Certainty in Ownership of Minerals.: Coal, Lignite, "And Other Minerals," 22 S. TEXAS
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of whether iron ore was included in a grant of "other minerals. 2 7 The
court, rather than using one of the usual tests, considered instead the damage that extraction of the substance would cause to the surface.28 The outcome of this approach was the "single" or "surface destruction" test:2 9
"Unless the contrary intention is affirmatively and fairly expressed, therefore, a grant or reservation of 'minerals' or 'mineral rights' should not be
construed to include a substance that must be removed by methods that
will, in effect, consume or deplete the surface estate."3 When applied, the
test meant that any substance which could not be extracted without
dam31
age to the surface was deemed to belong to the surface owner.
In 1977, the Texas Supreme Court in Reed v. Wylie (Reed1)32 reaffirmed33
the Acker test and expanded the holding announced in that decision.
L.J. 287, 306 (1982). The numerous modifictions made to Reed! in Reed!! illustrate the
degree of the complexity involved when the two issues are intermingled. Compare Reed v.
Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172-73 (Tex. 1977) (Reed I) (application of the surface destruction
test based upon extraction at time deed executed) with Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 75052 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., concurring) (Reed1) (application of surface destruction test consistent with modifications made to Acker test in Reed I).
27. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Tex. 1971). The deed purported to
convey a mineral interest in "an undivided 1/ interest in and to all of the oil, gas, and other
minerals in and under, and that may be produced from . . . [an 86-1h-acre tract]." Id at
349.
28. See id. at 351. The court admitted that the iron ore in Cherokee County had commercial value, because it had been used as a foundation in road construction. See id at 351.
The court referred in part to an English case, Hext v. Gill, L.R. 7 Ch. 699, 17 E.R.C. 429, 429
(1872), which held that clay had been conveyed by the instrument, but the court denied the
owner the right to extract it because of the damage which extraction might cause to the
surface. See id at 351. The Acker court also pointed to Professor Kuntz's general intent
theory as a basis for determining conveyance. See id at 352 (citing Kuntz, The Law Relating
to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. L.J. 107, 112 (1949)).
29. See Goodrum, Beneath The Surface-DestructionTest. The Dialectic of Intention and
Policy, 56 TEXAS L. REV. 99, 103 (1977); Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral-The Surface Destruction Test andMore, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 879, 885 (1977).
30. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (citing Clark, UraniumProblems,
18 TEX. B.J. 505 (1955)). The court acknowledged that Professor Kuntz's approach was
"entirely sound"; yet, it expanded upon his logic and held that the general intent of the
parties meant that they were thinking of extracting valuable minerals by subsurface methods
and had no intentions of destroying the surface. See id. at 352.
31. See id at 352. The question to be decided was whether iron ore was conveyed by a
deed executed in 1949. See id at 349. The court recognized that iron ore was of commerical
value but also pointed out that its extraction would destroy the surface. See id at 351. The
court concluded that the parties envisioned mine shafts or wells but did not contemplate
impairing the surface owner's rights to use the surface for grazing or agricultural purposes.
See id at 352.
32. 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
33. See id at 172. The court stressed that its decision was not aimed at dividing the
parties' rights to mine the substance. See id at 172. The court stated that it was "construing
the instrument. . . to ascertain the ownership of the substance." ld at 172; see Note, Own-
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The court held that a surface owner is entitled to the entire substance,
regardless of the various depths at which it is found, if extraction of any
portion of the substance would cause damage to the surface estate.3 4 The
court, however, decided that the surface owner must show that, "as of the
date of the instrument being construed, if the substance near the surface
had been extracted, that extraction
would necessarily have consumed or
35
surface.
land
the
depleted
Three years later in Reed 11,36 the Texas Supreme Court reheard the
Reed case after the actual location of the substance at issue had been determined.37 In this case, the court overruled its holding in Reed I that the
surface owner must prove that the mineral could be removed only by
methods that resulted in harm to the surface. 38 The court also abandoned
the Reed I requirement of proof of the extraction method measured at the
time the instrument was executed 3' Finally, the court declared that sub-

ershop of "Other Minerals" Reed v. Wylie Speaks Again, 18 Hous. L. REV. 201, 203 (1980)
(outlining changes made to Reed I by Reed HI).
34. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977). The court explained that the
intention of the parties to preserve the surface led to its decision to exclude the substance,
regardless of the depth at which it is located throughout the property. See id.at 172. This
rule, according to Professors Williams and Meyers, "would have a very unstabilizing effect
upon land titles" because it creates a question of fact necessitating consideration of the state
of the art of extracting the mineral. See IH. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW
§ 219, at 262.1-262.9 (1981).
35. Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977). Chief Justice Greenhill indicated
that the majority opinion of the court requiring the surface owner to prove that extraction of
the substance would cause damage to the surface is an onerous burden. See id at 172
(Greenhill, C.J., concurring). From the majority opinion, however, one may infer that this
burden can easily be satisfied with a showing of the depth of the substance. See id at 172.
The majority said that "if the lignite lies at the surface of the land, no further proof would be
required to establish [the surface owner's] title to the lignite .. ."Id at 172; see also Note,
Oil and Gas-The Surface Destruction Test As Applied In Reed v. Wylie and Its Possible
Effect on Arkansas Law, 33 ARK. L. REV. 422, 427 (1979) (suggesting Reed I was attempt to
clarify shortcomings of Acker). Reed I recognized that the Acker rationale (that any substance which must be removed by methods that will destroy the surface is not a mineral),
could potentially create situations where the grantee might take more than what was contemplated by the grantor. See Comment, Lignite-Surface or Mineral? The Single Test
Causes Double Trouble, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 287, 296 (1976). Reed I also broadened the
Acker holding by including unnamed minerals at all depths. See Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d
169, 172 (Tex. 1977).
36. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
37. See id at 744.
38. See id at 747. The court reasoned that the "controlling factor [was] the close physical relationship of the substance to the surface itself." Id at 747. It also stated that "that
portion of Reed [requiring] that the near surface substance 'must' be removed by surface
destruction methods is overruled." Id at 747.
39. See id.at 747 (emphasis added). The court noted that Acker. did not require that
determination of the recovery be limited to the time the instrument was executed. See id at
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stances within two hundred feet of the surface belonged to the surface
owner as a matter of law.'
In Moser v. United States Steel Corp.,4 1 the Texas Supreme Court, recognizing the uncertainty of title to minerals that had been created by the
Acker and the two Reed decisions, 42 held that title to a substance determined by the court to be a mineral belongs to the mineral estate.4 3 The
court explained that its decisions prior to Acker had been based upon a
variety of construction aids, namely, ejusdem generis, 4 scientific and tech-,
nical definitions, 45 the nature of the term "mineral,"'4 and the general intent theory propounded by Professor Kuntz.4 7 Seeing a need for
uniformity, the court declared that a substance would be determined to be
747. Such a requirement would create a question of fact that would vary with the "state of
the art of removal of the substance upon some particular date in the past." Id at 747. The
court recognized that other problems might result should it accept the requirementproblems of proof, problems of obtaining qualified experts, and problems of determining the
state of the art of removal. See id at 747.
40. See id at 748. This decision apparently resulted from an examination of the Acker
record where there appeared to be a question of title as to minerals found at varying depths
on Acker's estate. See id at 748.
41. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8, 1983).
42. See id at 428. The court explained that title uncertainty resulted because application of the Acker test and its progeny has required resolution of fact issues to establish title
to substances not specifically named in the conveying instrument. See id at 428.
43. See id at 428. The Acker and Reed approaches were "abandoned" by the court.
See id at 428.
44. See id at 428. Although the court did not explain why it had refused to use the rule
of ejusdem generis in determining whether hydrocarbons are minerals, the fact is that it had
previously been used to construe the phrase "timber, earth, stone, and minerals" to exclude
oil in a reservation. See Right of Way Oil Co. v. Gladys City Oil, Gas & Mfg. Co., 106 Tex.
94, 103, 157 S.W. 737, 740 (1913). A 1964 case best explains the court's rejection of the
doctrine of eusdem generis. See Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,
378 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. 1964) (meaning of term "other minerals" determined by examination of minerals specifically named immediately preceding term).
45. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.427, 428 (June 8, 1983).
In 1949, the court was concerned that the term "other minerals" might even include the soil
itself if the scientific or technical definition were applied to determine if a substance was a
mineral. See Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 513, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949).
46. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 428 (June 8, 1983).
The courts in Heinatz and Psencik considered the nature of the substance when it discussed
the validity of the term "mineral" in its ordinary and natural meaning. See Heinatz v.
Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949); Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658,
660-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ ref'd).
47. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.427, 428-29 (June 8,
1983). The general intent theory was accepted by the Acker court and acknowledged as a
sound approach in the instant case. Compare id at 428-29 (discussion of court's application
of the Kuntz theory) with Broyles, The Right to Mine Texas Uranium and Coal By Surface
Methods: Acker v. Guinn Revisited, 13 Hous. L. REV. 451, 475 (1976) (suggesting that 4cker
court did exactly what Professor Kuntz warned court not to do).
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a mineral, and thus belong to the mineral estate, "within the ordinary and
natural meaning of the term 'mineral,' [regardless of whether its] presence
or value is known at the time of extraction. 4 8 Uranium, the substance at
issue in Moser, was held to be a mineral, and all substances declared nonminerals in prior decisions would continue to be regarded as non-minerals.4 9 The court also addressed the rights and liabilities of the parties as to
the use of the surface.5" If the mineral is named in the instrument, the
mineral owner is liable for his negligence in extracting the mineral; if the
mineral is unnamed, he is strictly liable.5 The court explained that this
decision does not diminish the mineral owner's right to use the surface
reasonably, but that such right must be exercised with "due regard" for the
right of the surface owner to use his estate as he sees necessary. 2
48. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.427, 429 (June 8, 1983).
Among others, this approach was most notably used in two pre-Acker cases. See Heinatz v.
Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517-18, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949); Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915,
920 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no writ).
49. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J.427, 429 (June 8, 1983).
Other substances had been declared non-minerals by the court. See Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 821 (Tex. 1972) (water not included in reservation of "oil, gas, and
other minerals"); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 523, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) (commercial limestone and building stone not included in"mineral rights"); Atwood v. Rodman, 355
S.W.2d 206, 208 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (excluding limestone, caliche, sand, clay, and gravel removable by quarry or open pit methods from grant of oil, gas,
and "other minerals"); Union Sulphur Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 42 S.W.2d 182, 186
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1931, writ refd) (solid sulphur not conveyed in ordinary oil and
gas lease); Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1929, writ refd) (gravel excluded in lease of oil, gas, and "other minerals"). Although the court listed what it has decided to be non-minerals, it did not include a list of
substances that it has decided to be minerals. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26
Tex. Sup. Ct. J.427, 429 (June 8, 1983).
50. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 429 (June 8, 1983).
Since Acker, the issue of surface use has been inextricably tied to the issue of title to minerals. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (surface damage basis for determination of title); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. 1977) (title based on surface
destruction test). The Acker decision abandoned the approach of considering the nature of
the substance as the basis of title and focused upon surface damage caused by extraction.
See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
51. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 429 (June 8, 1983).
The court reasoned that the parties, at the time of conveyance, do not anticipate destruction
of the surface, whether the mineral is intended to be granted or reserved. See id.at 429. The
grantor has thus probably not determined the loss of value that the unnamed substance
would have on his estate if damage were done during its extraction. See id at 429.
52. See id at 430. It is settled law that the mineral estate is dominant since the surface
may be used to the extent reasonably necessary to extract minerals, but this right must be
exercised with "due regard" for the rights of the owner of the servient estate. See, e.g.,
Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. 1967) (unreasonable use held
not to be right of dominant estate); General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 162 Tex. 104, 109, 344
S.W.2d 668, 671 (1961) (due regard test requires lessor prove lessee used more of surface
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Although Moser is a relatively new decision and its effects may not be
known for several years, it is clear that major consequences will flow from
the court's decision that "minerals" belong to the mineral estate5 3 and that
the surface estate is entitled to protection from destruction.5 4 While the
uncertainty of title to minerals is substantially eliminated by this decision,55 the remaining doubts of the mineral and surface owners as to exactly how the "mineral test" is to be applied will continue to kindle title
suits.56 The certainty of title resulting from the Moser decision, however,
should expedite the production and development of needed energy resources.5 7 Once title to unnamed minerals has been established by the

than necessary); Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 95, 344 S.W.2d 863, 866 (1961) (negligence
in use of surface and unreasonable use of surface are identical). As the court later said, "the
due regard concept defines more fully what is to be considered . . . [as] reasonably necessary." Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. 1971). When there is only one
method of using the surface in order to extract the minerals, the lessee has the right to use
the surface regardless of the damage that results. See id at 622. If there are alternative
methods of extracting the minerals, the alternative may be necessary in order to give "due
regard" to the surface owner's competing right to use the surface as he sees necessary. See
id at 622.
53. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 428 (June 8, 1983).
54. See id at 429. The court's decision focused upon the two major aspects of the
present controversy of mineral grants and reservations: title to the mineral, and its corollary,
surface use. See id at 428-29. The substance of the court's decision relating to the title may
be summarized as follows: (1) the test of ownership is whether a substance is a mineral, (2)
the mineral test is whether the substance is a mineral within the ordinary and natural meaning of the term "mineral", (3) uranium is a mineral, and (4) substances declared to be nonminerals in prior decisions continue to be non-minerals. See id. at 428-29. The court included the following points relating to surface use: (1) the mineral owner is liable for his
negligence in extracting minerals specifically named, (2) the mineral owner is strictly liable
in extracting minerals not specifically named, and (3) the surface owner has a right of due
regard for his own uses. See id at 429-30.
55. See id at 428. The court admitted that its prior decisions had led to title uncertainty and specifically rejected Acker and Reed (I and II) for future decisions. See id at 428;
see also Comment, Lignite: Surface or Mineral-The Surface Destruction Test and More, 29
BAYLOR L. REV. 879, 884, 902-03 (1979) (uncertainty of title illustrated by methods of mining uranium); Broyles, The Right to Mine Texas Uranium and Coal by Surface Methods:
Acker v. Guinn Revisited, 13 Hous. L. REV. 451, 453-59 (1976) (relating issue of title to issue
of surface use and uncertainties created by Acker decision).
56. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 429 (June 8, 1983).
The determination of whether a substance is or is not a mineral will be made by considering
whether the substance is a "mineral" within the ordinary and natural meaning of that word.
See id at 429. Compare WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 732 (1977) ("any of
various naturally occurring homogeneous substances such as stone, coal, salt, sulfur, sand,
petroleum, water, or natural gas obtained for man's use . . . from the ground") with
Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1929, writ ref d) (sand and gravel determined to be non-minerals).
57. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 428 (June 8, 1983).
Admitting abandonment of the decisions ofAcker and Reed (I and II), the court presumably
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courts, ownership will be irrevocable; mineral owners should then employ
efficient and economical extraction methods rather than use other methods
just to maintain their titles simply because they will cause less destruction
to the surface.5 8
Moser confirms the rights of both estates: first, it permits the mineral
owner the reasonable use of the surface within the limits he has traditionally enjoyed once title was established;59 second, it also deters destruction
of the surface estate by providing compensation to the surface owner for
injuries caused by removal of the mineral.6" Although the court employs
compensation to protect the surface from consumption or depletion, some
surface owners will naturally recognize a potential for profit. 6' Moreover,
the court's emphasis upon the mineral owner's liabilities, with no discussion of the surface owner's liabilities for interfering with this "rule of
law," 62 indicates that suits for surface damages will increase.6 3 The lan-

aimed to correct the problem of uncertainty by changing the test for determination of title.
See id.at 428; see also Broyles, The Right to Mine Texas Uranium and Coal By Surface Methods." Acker v. Guinn Revisited, 13 Hous. L. REV. 451, 479 (1976) (reexamination of Acker
needed to minimize its adverse effects in order to prevent wasting energy resources); Comment, Lignite. Surface or Mineral-The Surface Destruction Test and More, 29 BAYLOR L.
REV. 879, 905 (1977) (Acker decision created confusion and deterred development of natural
resources); Comment, The Needfor Certainty in Ownership of Minerals. Coal Lignite, "'And
Other Minerals" 22 S. TEX. L.J. 287, 307 (1982) (suggesting that clearing up uncertainty of
title would promote production of resources).
58. See Comment, Lignite: Surace or Mineral-The Surface Destruction Test and
More, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 879, 889-90 (1977). The author raises a very substantive issue:
whether the ownership of minerals may change as technology precludes damages caused by
extraction. See id. at 889.
59. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 429 (June 8, 1983);
see also Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972) (use of surface estate
implied by law); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971) (mineral estate
impliedly authorized to use surface); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133,
134 (Tex. 1967) (extent of reasonable use determined by lease). See generally I E. KUNTZ, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 3.2, at 79-81 (1962) (discussion of reasonable
use permitted by surface owner).
60. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 429-30 (June 8,
1983).
61. See id at 429. The court explained that the surface owner considers the value of all
minerals when determining the consideration he will seek for mineral grants. See id at 429.
For this reason, the court held that strict liability is justifiable when the surface owner was
not paid for unnamed substances. See id. at 429.
62. See id. at 429. The court refers to the right of the mineral owner to use the surface
as incidental to the extraction of the minerals as "an imperative rule of mineral law." Id at
429.
63. See id at 429-30. Previous suits for surface damage have been based on the theories of negligence, nuisance, breach of a regulation or statute, and strict liability (in other
jurisdictions). See I H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 217, at 186.13-.16
(198 1). For damages based upon negligence, see Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal
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guage of the decision suggests that strict liability damages may be avoided
by specifically naming the substance in the instrument.6 4 Regardless,
though, of any improvement that may result in the preparation of legal
instruments, damage suits initially will be protracted until certain questions are resolved: what constitutes reasonable use?, what is the proper
measure of damages?, and how far must the surface owner be
accommodated?6 5
Moser also reflects the court's interest in protecting the surface, a prevalent concern in the Acker decision and its progeny,6 6 is reaffirmed in
Moser.67 This same concern is also stated in the Texas Uranium Surface
Mining & Reclamation Act (TUSMRA), 68 the purpose of which is to promote the development of the state's natural resources within the bounds of
environmental constraints. 69 The limitations imposed by the Moser deci-

Co., 151 Tex. 251, 255, 248 S.W.2d 731, 735 (1952) (negligent pollution of lake during extraction); Moran Corp. v. Murray, 381 S.W.2d 324, 325 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964,
writ refd n.r.e.) (break in wall of salt water pit found to be act of negligence and not trespass). For damages based upon nuisance, see Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d
659, 662 (7th Cir. 1975) (recovery of damages sustained on theory that waterflood operation
created private nuisance); Love Petroleum Co. v. Jones, 205 So. 2d 274, 275 (Miss. 1967)
(stream pollution found a nuisance created by escaping oil and salt water). For damages
based upon breach of regulation or statute, see Klokstad v. Ward, 131 N.W.2d 244, 249
(N.D. 1964) (overflow of brine pit held to be a nuisance); Murfee v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
492 S.W.2d 667, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (violation of Railroad
Commission Rule 20 based upon negligence). For damages based upon strict liability, see
Langlinais v. Geophysical Serv. Inc., Ill So. 2d 781, 783 (La. 1959) (explosion causing break
in levee); Pate v. Western Geophysical Co., 91 So.2d 431, 434 (La. App. 1956) (explosion
resulting in damage to water wells and buildings). The doctrine of absolute or strict liability
in general, however, has not been permitted in Texas. See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128
Tex. 155, 159, 96 S.W.2d 221, 225 (1936); Klosterman v. Houston Geophysical Co., 315
S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, writ retd n.r.e.).
64. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 429 (June 8, 1983).
65. See id at 429-30. The problems arising from suits seeking redress for damages to
the surface were problems not created by Moser. See, e.g., Ball v. Dillard, 602 S.W.2d 521,
524 (Tex. 1980) (Spears, J., dissenting) (evidentiary problems in meeting burden of showing
reasonable use of surface); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 811 (Tex. 1972) (problem of application of implied doctrine in showing reasonable use); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones,
470 S.W.2d 618, 626 (Tex. 1971) (McGee, J., dissenting) (problem of determining damages
when applying "due regard" doctrine). Moser, by emphasizing the protection of the surface,
the doctrine of "due regard", and the imposition of strict liability, adds to problems already
creating turbulence in this area of the law. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 427, 429-30 (June 8, 1983).
66. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 748 (Tex. 1980); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d
169, 170 (Tex. 1977); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
67. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 429 (June 8, 1983).
68. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131.001-132.000. (Vernon 1978 & Vernon Supp.
1982-1983).
69. See id § 131.003 (Vernon 1978). The code ensures that the rights of the surface

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol15/iss2/10

12

Skeins: Title to Substances Determined to Be Minerals as a Matter of Law

19841

CASENOTES

sion, and TUSMRA as well, do not degrade the mineral owner's rights to
extract the mineral.7" The legislature and the court simply will not permit
surface destruction when minerals are removed. 7 '
The Moser decision is also a blending of several methods used by past
courts. First, pre-Acker courts established title to minerals by determining
that substances were minerals, based upon various tests. 72 Moser is a return to that approach, but the test of whether or not a substance is a mineral is to be based exclusively upon the "ordinary and natural meaning"
test.73 Second, the court has consistently allowed surface owners recovery
for damages arising from negligence, in both the pre-Acker and post-Acker
periods.74 Moser continues this practice, but it goes further by providing
for strict liability when substances are not named in the instrument.7 5
Whereas negligence in the past was viewed in terms of unreasonableness
based on the degree of harm to the surface,7 6 Moser incorporates the "due
regard" doctrine as an additional basis for determining
unreasonableness. 7 7

landowner and other persons with a legal interest in the land are protected from unregulated
surface mining operations. See id § 131.003(2). The code also prevents unreasonable degradation of the land and water resources by requiring that mining operations also include
reclamation procedures in the event of damage. See id. § 131.003(5).
70. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 430 (June 8, 1983).
71. See id. at 428-30; see also TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 131.002 (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983) (declaration of policy expressly provides for surface restoration).
72. See, e.g., Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 523, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) (use of
ordinary and natural meaning of term "mineral" to determine substance not a mineral);
Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ refd) (chemical composition of the substance at issue determines whether a mineral); Praeletorian Diamond Oil Ass'n v. Garvey, 15 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1929, writ refd
n.r.e) (whether gravel a mineral is immaterial absent intent to convey the substance).
73. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 429 (June 8, 1983).
According to the court in Heinatz, the use of the ordinary and natural meaning expresses the
intent of the parties because they are "presumed to have been familiar with the ordinary and
natural meaning of the word ..
" Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517, 217 S.W.2d 994,
997 (1949). The use of the "ordinary and natural" test has been widespread throughout the
United States. See, e.g., Burke v. Southern Pac. R.R., 234 U.S. 669, 711 (1914) (petroleum
and mineral oil a mineral within meaning of word "mineral"); Rudd v. Hayden, 97 S.W.2d
35, 37 (Ky. Ct. App. 1936) (cement not ordinarily mineral in ordinary and natural sense of
that term); Beury v. Shelton, 144 S.E. 629, 633 (Va. 1928) (limestone not reserved by ordinary and natural meaning of term "mineral").
74. See Sheffield v. Gibbs Bros. & Co., 596 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1st Dist.] 1980, no writ); Kenny v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1961, writ ref'd); Fleming Found. v. Texaco, 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1960, writ refd n.r.e.).
75. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 429 (June 8, 1983).
76. See id at 430.
77. See id at 430.
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The adoption of strict liability in awarding damages to the surface owner apparently was inserted as an equitable measure and one to encourage
protection of the surface estate. 78 This is a bold decision, since Texas has
historically repudiated in strong language the doctrine of strict liability.7 9
Many commentators argue that strict liability, even when used in blasting
cases, is a reversion to outmoded law and that its adoption is a step backward to primitive concepts.8 °
The Moser decision is also not retroactive for the period between Acker
and Moser.8" The court's attempt at equity, though, does not add to the
problems of those who contracted during this period; the Moser decision is
simply not applicable to them.8" Moser neither disturbs the law of this
period nor adds to the ambiguities attending the Acker and Reed decisions;
the controlling law for this period is that which was "in effect at the time
the [instrument] was executed." 8 3 Although the court did not categorically
state whether Moser applies to the pre-Acker period, it appears that it does
apply since the Moser approach to determining title generally parallels
that used by the courts of the pre-Acker period.8 4

78. See id at 429. The court does not specifically refer to the term "strict" or "absolute" liability; rather, it infers that damages should not be restricted to negligently inflicted
damages when the mineral is not specifically named in the instrument. See id at 429.
79. See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 166, 96 S.W.2d 221, 226 (1936) (oil
lessee held not liable unless showing of negligence); Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Currie, 100
Tex. 136, 140, 96 S.W. 1073, 1074 (1906) (wrongful death liability of employer based upon
negligence instead of absolute liability); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Oakes, 94 Tex. 155, 159, 58
S.W. 999, 1001 (1900) (absent negligence, defendant who planted grass not liable for damages caused by its spreading); Cosden Oil Co. v. Sides, 35 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1931, no writ) (recovery allowed only when defendant found negligent in performance of lawful acts).
80. See 4 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 661 (1927); Smith, Liabilityfor
Substantial Physical Damage to Land By Blasting-The Rule of the Future, 33 HARV. L. REV.
542, 550-52 (1919); see also Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 399, 426
(1942).
81. See Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427, 430 (June 8, 1983).
82. See id.at 430. It is inapplicable because the Moser decision applies only to contracts, leases, and deeds contracted before Acker and beginning with the Moser decision in
1983. See id.at 430. As the leases of the Acker to Moser period expire, however, owners
may seek methods to circumvent the secondary terms of the leases of the Acker to Moser
period.
83. See id.at 430.
84. See id at 428-30. The court discusses at length the various construction aids it used
to determine title in past cases. See id.at 428. Before Acker, the determination of title was
based upon whether the substance was a mineral. See id.at 428-29. Since Acker and its
progeny significantly departed from this approach and thereby created title uncertainties,
the court abandoned the surface destruction test and returned to the pre-Acker system which
relied upon the test of ordinary and natural meaning to classify the substance. See id at
428.
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To some degree, the three major pronouncements of Moser counter each
other: title litigation will decrease, but damage litigation will increase; title
certainty will promote the production of minerals, but the fear of causing
damage may lead to the abandonment of more efficient and economical
methods of extraction; the surface estate is not to be consumed or depleted,
but it may be severely damaged should surface owners bargain to waive
their rights.8 5 However one may view the prospective gains and losses
from the decision, Moser does not purport to be the ultimate solution to all
of the problems which have saturated this area of the law for a half century. This landmark is indeed a giant step in the evolution of the processes
applied to balance two continually competing and changing interests.8 6 It
does not answer many of the questions it poses, but in its treatment of the
substantive rights of the two estates, the court has displayed the parameters
of its future decisions, and in so doing, has provided some degree of stability that the estates have lost since Acker. Most of all, the rights of the
competing parties have been addressed in a manner that promotes the development of critically needed natural resources. This return, alone, will
far outweigh any shortcomings that will initially be experienced in this
turbulent area of the law.
HarrySkeins
85. See id at 429. The court concedes that the parties recognize the value of the minerals they grant or reserve. See id at 430. It is presumed they also know that they can bargain
to waive the right to demand compliance with their rights.
86. See id at 430. The court discusses these competing interests as they relate to the

"due regard" doctrine. See id at 430.
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